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BEYOND ADVERTISING CONTROLS:
INFLUENCING JUNK-FOOD
MARKETING AND CONSUMPTION
WITH POLICY INNOVATIONS
DEVELOPED IN TOBACCO CONTROL
Randolph Kline, Samantha Graff
Leslie Zellers, and Marice Ashe
I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the tobacco control movement and the improved-
nutrition advocacy movement (sometimes called the obesity
prevention movement) are on parallel tracks. Both movements are
grounded in compelling epidemiological data that document the
extraordinary toll on human health and mortality caused by unhealth-
ful consumer products. 1 Tobacco products kill more than 440,000
Americans annually, and the total cost of smoking in California in
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Leslie Zellers, J.D., is TALC's Legal Director; Marice Ashe, J.D., MPH, is
TALC's Project Director. The authors would like to thank research assistants
Blake Thompson and Sarah Huchel, J.D., for their excellent contributions to
this work as well as Carrie Spector and Robin Salsburg, J.D. for their
immensely helpful comments on the Article. This Article was made possible,
in part, with funds received from the California Department of Health Services,
under contract #04-35336.
1. See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROFILING THE LEADING CAUSES OF
DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES--CALIFORNIA 1-2, http://www.cdc
.gov/nccdphp/publications/factsheets/ChronicDisease/pdfs/California.pdf (last
visited Jan. 21, 2006) (discussing poor health conditions as one of the leading
causes of death in the country); WENDY MAX ET AL., CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH
SERVS., THE COST OF SMOKING IN CALIFORNIA, 1999, at 9 (2002), available at
http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/cdic/tcs/documents/pubs/costofsmokingl999.pdf
(showing statistics for the large number of deaths attributed to smoking in
California alone).
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1999, including both direct and indirect costs, was estimated to be
$15.8 billion.2 Although fewer deaths are currently attributed di-
rectly to poor nutrition, the morbidity caused by diseases related to
poor nutrition (such as diabetes, heart disease, stroke, some cancers,
and osteoporosis) is one of the leading causes of disability and death
in the country.3 In 2000, California spent $21.7 billion on direct and
indirect medical care, worker's compensation, and lost productivity
related to poor nutrition and physical inactivity.4
The two movements are also similar in that both address
problems caused by, or directly associated with, consumer products
that are heavily promoted through a wide array of media channels.
Cigarette companies spent $15.2 billion in 2003 promoting their
products via several methods including (i) point-of-sale, newspaper,
and direct mail advertising; (ii) promotional allowances to retailers;
and (iii) sponsorship of sporting events, public entertainment, and
theme events like bar nights.5 Likewise, in 1999, the U.S. food
industry spent $7.3 billion advertising its products.
6
Finally, both movements engage in ecological change strategies,
employing public policy tactics to "denormalize" the use of the
2. MAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 7; J.L. Fellows et al., Annual Smoking-
Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs-
United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300,
301 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5114.pdf.
3. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 2.
4. DAVID CHENOWITH, CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., THE ECONOMIC
COSTS OF PHYSICAL INACTIVITY, OBESITY, AND OVERWEIGHT IN CALIFORNIA:
HEALTH CARE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND LOST PRODUCTIVITY 2
(2005), available at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ps/cdic/cpns/press/downloads/Cost
ofObesityToplineReport.pdf.
5. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, ALLOCATIONS OF U.S.
CIGARETTE COMPANY MARKETING EXPENDITURES SINCE 1998, at 1 (2005),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0079.pdf (citing FTC, CIGA-
RETTE REPORT FOR 2003, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/cigarette05/050809cigrpt.pdf); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC
Report to Congress Shows Increases in Smokeless Tobacco Revenues and
Advertising and Promotional Expenditures (Aug. 12, 2003), http://www.ftc
.gov/opa/2003/08/smokeless.htm (stating that smokeless tobacco companies
spent $237 million 'advertising their products in 2001). Manufacturers also
provided $10.8 billion in price discounts. Press Release, FTC, supra, at 2.
6. Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing
Directed at Children and Adolescents in the US., 1 INT'L J. BEHAV. NUTRI-
TION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 3 (2004) (citing J. MICHAEL HARRIS ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE U.S. FOOD MARKETING SYSTEM, 2002, at 3 (2002)).
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products, and thus address the morbidity and mortality associated
with such heavily-promoted, unhealthy consumer products. The
tobacco control movement is far more advanced than the nutrition
advocacy movement in this regard. The tobacco control movement
has spent more than twenty years successfully pursuing aggressive
public policy campaigns to: (i) raise taxes on tobacco products; (ii)
limit exposure to secondhand smoke in public places, workplaces,
outdoor venues, and in some instances even private residences; (iii)
counter and curtail the advertising and promotion of tobacco
products to youth; and (iv) initiate litigation against the industry for
the public costs associated with tobacco-related illnesses.
7
Denormalization campaigns challenge the status quo: no longer
considered the norm, the public increasingly sees tobacco use as a
marginalized behavior that is contrary to the best interests of
children, adults, and society as a whole.
Nutrition advocates openly acknowledge that their profession
has much to learn from the tobacco control movement. Nutrition
advocates are succeeding as they begin setting policy agendas to
lower the incidence of obesity/overweight and their related health
problems. Their efforts have led to bans on the sales of soda and
other sweetened beverages in elementary and high schools,8 and
7. Michael Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control: Review of an
Emerging Public Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858, 859 (1997).
8. For the 2001-2002 school year, Oakland Unified School District
implemented a comprehensive, six-goal, nutrition policy, and, as a result,
rejected a potentially lucrative pouring rights contract. California Project
Lean, Creating a Comprehensive District Nutrition Policy (Mar. 18, 2004),
http://www.califomiaprojectlean.org (search "Creating a Comprehensive
District Nutrition Policy," then follow hyperlink). The policy's six goals were
to: "(1) insure that no OUSD student goes hungry; (2) improve the nutritional
quality of all food served to OUSD students; (3) serve enjoyable foods from
diverse cultures; (4) improve the quality of food service jobs; (5) integrate
nutrition into the district's education program; and (6) establish a Nutrition
Advisory Board." Id. At the state level, the California legislature has passed
Senate Bill 12 and has another bill pending, Assembly Bill 622, that would
affect vending machines in schools. S.B. 12, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2005); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, VENDING
MACHINES IN SCHOOLS (2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs
/health/vending.htm. Senate Bill 12 (i) restricts portion sizes of a la carte items
in elementary school cafeterias (no item can exceed the serving size of the food
served in the National School Lunch Program or School Breakfast Program)
and (ii) restricts food items in vending machines to less than 200 calories per
item. S.B. 12, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). Assembly
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institution of basic nutritional standards for vending machine
products in public buildings. 9 Meanwhile, significant media atten-
tion has increased public awareness about the problems associated
with the overwhelming availability of unhealthful food choices and
the lack of access to healthful choices, especially in low-income
communities.'
0
This Article addresses one policy area that both movements are
still grappling to address: controlling the effects of advertising and
promotion of the unhealthy products through the mass media. The
tobacco control movement has secured a ban on tobacco advertising
on television."I It has also negotiated the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) with the tobacco industry, under which the
industry gave up some of its constitutionally protected free speech
rights, including its right to promote its products through spon-
Bill 622 would, if passed, impose additional nutritional standards for food and
beverages sold or served to students. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, supra. In addition, California recently passed Senate Bill 965, which
prohibits the sale of sodas and other carbonated beverages in K-12 public
schools. S.B. 965, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (amending
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49431.5 West 2005). Similarly, West Virginia enacted
the Promoting Healthy Lifestyles in West Virginia Act of 2005, which requires
senior high schools to offer equal amounts of soft drinks and healthy beverages
in vending machines. H.B. 2816, 2005 Leg., 79th Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
9. See CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVS., CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
VENDING MACHINE POLICY (2004), http://www.cchealth.org/topics/nutrition
/cc countyvendingmachinepolicy.php. Under its "Nutrition Standards for
Vending Machine Beverages and Snacks," the Board of Supervisors adopted
the following policy:
50% of beverages offered in each vending machine shall be one or a
combination of the following:
a. Water
b. Coffee or tea'
c. Reduced fat milk (including soy or cow's milk, chocolate or other
flavored milk not containing more than 15 grams of added sugar per
250 gram serving or 3 tsp sugar per 1 cup milk)
d. 100% fruit/vegetable juice
e. Fruit based drinks containing at least 50% juice and no added
caloric sweeteners
f. All other non-caloric beverages, including diet sodas.
Id.
10. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 8.
11. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000)).
606
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sorships, billboards, and other media venues. 12  However, the
tobacco control movement has had difficulty restricting other forms
of advertising. The U.S. Supreme Court handed the movement a
significant setback in Lorillard v. Reilly,' 3 a commercial speech case
that invalidated Massachusetts regulations limiting indoor and
outdoor tobacco advertising near schools and playgrounds.'
4
Lorillard effectively sounded the death knell for local regulations
that ban publicly visible tobacco advertising.'
5
Given that the First Amendment presents a major obstacle to
controlling advertising for unhealthful products, the tobacco control
movement has developed innovative policy strategies for dampening
the impact of tobacco advertising while avoiding First Amendment
scrutiny. This Article highlights several of these strategies, explains
why they are legally sound, and suggests how they might apply in
the nutrition context.1 6 The policies considered here include:
Regulating a product directly (in other words, regulating
what, when, where, and how products are sold), which
12. Master Settlement Agreement § III, http://www.caag.state.ca.us/tobacco
/pdf/1msa.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
13. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
14. The Massachusetts regulations contained two main provisions: one
prohibiting placing outdoor tobacco advertisements or indoor ads visible from
the outside within a 1000 foot radius of a school playground; the other
prohibiting point-of-sale tobacco advertisements placed lower than five feet
from the floor of stores located within a 1000 foot radius of a school or
playground. Id. at 534-35.
15. See Kerri L. Keller, Note, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The
Supreme Court Takes First Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke By Applying
the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based Regulations, 36 AKRON L.
REV. 133 (2002) (describing the implications of the Lorillard case and the
history of the "commercial speech doctrine").
16. Most of the options described subsequently involve laws, regulations,
or agreements that affect a defined category of food, mainly the unhealthful
food choices. But what qualifies as an unhealthful food? Defining what foods
fall within a regulation or agreement and what foods fall outside of it may be a
far greater challenge than crafting a legally sufficient policy. This Article does
not address what factors should be considered when defining food types for
policy interventions. Undoubtedly, science and professional opinions will play
a large role in determining which foods to focus on and how to make the
determination. However, assuming most product regulations are only subject
to a rational basis review, courts will likely accept whatever line a legislative
body draws even if it is not the best line, or even a good one, so long as it is at
least a rational line. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979).
May 2006]
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includes:
o Banning the product;
o Regulating the retail sale of the product (e.g., age
restrictions);
o Employing land use regulations to limit where
product retailers can operate;
o Imposing product standards; and
o Taxing or exacting a fee on the product.
" Regulating a product by agreement, which includes:
o Private binding contracts;
o Public binding contracts;
o Private litigation settlements;
o Public litigation settlements;
o Private nonbinding agreements; and
o Public nonbinding agreements.
* Government-sponsored education and counter-adver-
tising
II. CONTROLLING UNHEALTHFUL FOOD PRODUCTS
OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Legal Landscape
Depending on the type of regulatory action the government
takes, courts will impose different standards of review when
determining the constitutionality of the regulation. Generally, there
are three potential levels of review for any given law:
* Rational basis, applicable to most laws, is the standard
most deferential to a legislative body's decision.17
" Intermediate scrutiny, a more demanding standard, is
applicable to laws affecting commercial speech (the four
prong Central Hudson test)'8 and gender-specific laws.
17. See, e.g., id. at 96-97.
18. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, struck down a state
regulation banning promotional advertising by electric utilities. 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In so doing' it enunciated a four-prong test for assessing the validity of
a government restriction of commercial speech based on its content:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
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e Strict scrutiny, the highest standard, is applicable to laws
affecting most types of speech, fundamental rights, and
suspect classifications (race, ethnicity, or national
origin). 19
Legislation or regulations subject to the rational basis test are
generally valid as long as they bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental purpose.20 Under the rational basis test, a
court will give great deference to government regulatory action.
2 1
Courts will rarely overturn government action if the action is subject
to the rational basis test.22 Under the rational basis test, a rational
relationship need not be established by scientific studies. 23  Less
rigorous data or information, even rational beliefs, are acceptable as
long as they provide plausible support for the legislative body's
conclusion that a policy or regulation is justified.24 In other words, a
misleading [prong one]. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial [prong two]. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted [prong three], and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest
[prong four].
Id. at 564. Prong one of this test sets a threshold. Id. In order to reach prongs
two through four, a court must find that the advertising at issue accurately
informs the public about lawful activity. Id. In other words, the government is
free, without oversight of the courts, to suppress all advertising that promotes
illegal activity or that is false or inherently misleading. Id. Prong two requires
the government to assert a substantial interest intended to be met by the
advertising restriction. Id. Prongs three and four pertain to the fit between the
government interest: and the advertising restriction. Id. Under prong three, the
restriction must directly advance the government interest; to survive, it cannot
provide "only ineffective or remote support" for the interest. Id. Prong four
mandates that the restriction be no more extensive than necessary to achieve
the government interest. Id.
19. LAWRENCE '0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 80-81 (2001).
20. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
522 (1962).
21. GOSTIN, supra note 19, at 78.
22. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949).
23. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
24. Id. ("[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.").
May 2006]
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regulation is supported by a rational relationship unless it is arbitrary,
capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.25 A legitimate
state purpose exists when government legislates to protect the
public's health, morals, safety, or general welfare. z6 Therefore, laws
motivated by public health almost always involve a legitimate
government concern.27 Finally, the burden is on the party chal-
lenging the law to "convince the court that the legislative facts on
which the [law] is apparently based could not reasonably be con-
ceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker."
28
25. Amel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 524 (1980)
(holding that zoning is a legislative act that may only be reviewed under
traditional mandate principles, that is, for arbitrary and capricious actions);
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Ret. Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 34-35
n.2 (1974) (stating that judicial review of quasi-legislative acts is limited to
whether the action taken was "arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support," or contrary to required legal procedures); see also
Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 460-61 (1949) (stating that
zoning legislation is presumed to be constitutional, and this presumption can
only be overcome br a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality).
26. Consol. Rock Prods. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522 (1962)
(quoting Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 447, 490 (1925)).
27. The broad powers enjoyed by public health officials are grounded in a
legal principle called the "police power." GOSTIN, supra note 19, at 80-81.
The police power is the natural prerogative of sovereign governments to enact
laws, promulgate regulations, and take action to protect, preserve, and promote
public health, safety, and welfare. Id. In the words of the California Supreme
Court, "[t]he preservation of the public health is universally conceded to be
one of the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereignty, and whatever
reasonably tends to preserve the public health is a subject upon which the
legislature, within its police power, may take action." Patrick v. Riley, 287 P.
455, 456 (Cal. 1930) (upholding a bovine tuberculosis control law).
The concept of the lolice power comes from common law, a body of judicially
created law that spans from medieval England to the present day. David A.
Thomas, Finding More Pieces of the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 501-516 (2004). In political
theory, the police power describes the conditions under which a sovereign
government can legitimately intrude upon a person's autonomy, privacy,
liberty, or property. GOSTIN, supra note 19, at 47-48. The police power is an
inherent authority of the states. Id. at 48. The federal government does not
have inherent police power. Id. at 26-27. The states can delegate their police
power to local governments; some states have done so through their state
constitution, while others have accomplished this by statute. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. XI, § 7; COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-401 (2005).
28. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)); see also Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
610
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Generally, when government regulates a product directly,
including the sale of a product, the Court will review the law under
the rational basis test. On the other hand, when government
regulates commercial speech (that is directed, at least in part, to
adults) about a product, the Court will apply some form of
intermediate scrutiny, such as the Central Hudson test, in reviewing
its constitutionality. °
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)) ("[T]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it.").
29. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 461 (holding that the
proper standard of review for a law banning plastic milk containers was
rational basis).
30. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). See supra hote 18 for more detail on the Central Hudson test. Note
that once a product is prohibited, ads about the product become easier to
control because the ad no longer relates to a legally available product, and thus
the Central Hudson test is easier to satisfy. GOSTIN, supra note 19, at 158
(noting that the government can ban commercial speech related to "illicit drug
use; driving while intoxicated; or underage possession of tobacco, alcoholic
beverages, or handguns"). The Court has applied a more deferential standard
than the Central Hudson test when evaluating governmental restrictions on
speech aimed at an audience made up predominantly of children because the
intellectual and emotional immaturity of children makes them particularly
vulnerable to harm., See Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech,
57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (2005).
In Ginsberg v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a special test for
government regulation of speech received by minors, though the issue before
the Court was one of indecent speech rather than commercial speech. The
Court stated that:
[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not
necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its
dissemination to children.... Because of the State's exigent interest
in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can
exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of
its community by barring the distribution to children of books
recognized to be suitable for adults.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (alteration in the original)
(quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)). The
Supreme Court has also determined that speech regulations on public school
campuses should receive a special level of review. See Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969). In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court
"recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,'
and must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
May 20061
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For the purposes of judicial review, legislators will prefer a law
subject only to the rational basis test over a law subject to greater
scrutiny because i rational basis law is more likely to survive a legal
challenge. In the context of how Lorillard might affect marketing
restrictions on unhealthful foods, there are three additional reasons to
pursue, at least initially, product-focused laws subject to rational
basis review.
First, to the extent that nonspeech regulations create an envi-
ronment in which certain products are prohibited from being sold,
such as a ban on soda sales in the immediate neighborhood of
schools, subsequent or contemporaneous restrictions on marketing
such products within the product-ban range more easily pass prong
one of the Central Hudson test. Prong one is the threshold question
of whether a commercial message concerns a lawful activity and is
not misleading. 3' If a product cannot be lawfully sold, then the First
Amendment, via Central Hudson, does not protect the advertising of
the product.32 For example, once soda sales are banned in the neigh-
borhood surrounding school grounds, a ban on soda ads at stores
within the product-ban radius of school grounds stands a much
greater chance of surviving a legal challenge because the ads would
not relate to a product that is legally available at the store.
33
Second, if government regulates speech, such as advertisements,
commercials, billboards, and other marketing media, courts will look
to see what nonmarketing options the government has tried and how
effective they were when analyzing prongs. three and four of the
Central Hudson test. 34 If a court can imagine laws that do not regu-
ronment.'" 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citations omitted).
31. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (holding a
federal statute constitutional as applied, thereby prohibiting a North Carolina
station from broadcasting lottery advertising when such lotteries were banned
in North Carolina).
34. Prong three of the Central Hudson test examines whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and prong four asks
whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; see, e.g., Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding the government's advertising
ban on compounded drugs unconstitutional because there were several non-
speech-related means to achieve the government's goal, including (i)
regulating large-scale manufacturing, (ii) prohibiting wholesale sales, and (iii)
612
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late speech, including direct product regulations, but might mitigate
or solve a problem as well as or better than laws that do regulate
speech, a court is likely to require such nonspeech laws be attempted
and proven to fail before it will uphold a regulation of speech subject
to the Central Hudson test.3 5  In other words, the failure of gov-
ernment to attempt to solve a problem without regulating speech is
likely to weigh against a government regulation of speech if a court
considers whether a marketing law directly advances the gov-
ernment's interest and whether it is more extensive than necessary
under Central Hudson.
36
Lastly, because the most influential marketing of unhealthful
food to children occurs via federally regulated media, such as tele-
vision, radio, and the Internet, 37 local and state governments may be
unable to enact effective legislative curbs to such marketing due to
potential federal law preemption of state action.
B. Regulating the Product by Law:
Regulating the What, When, Where, and How of Retail Sales
Local and state government regulations concerning what
products can be sold and what conditions can be imposed on sales
within a jurisdiction are subject only to the deferential rational basis
test.38 Therefore, legislators and government agencies have broad
power to create laws and regulations related to the sales of goods as
long as the laws do not affect commercial speech.39
1. Product Bans & Other Retailing Restrictions
a. Product bans
If government determines that a product is a health or safety
threat, it may ban the product outright.40 Generally, banning a pro-
limiting manufacturing to prescriptions received).
35. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 372-73.
36. Id. at 371-73.
37. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-1110 (2000) (creating the Federal
Communications Commission and providing for federal regulation of various
types of media).
38. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315-18 (1993).
39. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 374 (describing the Central Hudson
test as "significantly stricter than the rational basis test").
40. See Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 520-521
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duct does not involve speech, a fundamental right, or suspect
classification and therefore receives rational basis review when
challenged. 4 1 From a legal perspective, product bans are straightfor-
ward: a government simply passes a law that says product X cannot
be sold. Politically, however, such bans may be very difficult.
There are a few examples of product bans in tobacco control.42
The city of Chicago banned imported cigarettes favored by young
people called "bidis," coming in almond, cinnamon, clove, root beer,
strawberry and vanilla flavors.43  Following Chicago's lead, the
entire state of Illinois banned bidis."
Notable bans of non-tobacco products include a complete ban on
the sale of spray paint in Chicago in response to a pervasive graffiti
problem. 45 Elsewhere, environmental concerns about Styrofoam fast
food containers prompted bans on polystyrene in Portland, Oregon,
and Suffolk County, New York.46 Additionally, concern about the
effects of mercury on child development resulted in bans on mercury
thermometers in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Duluth, Minnesota.47
In upholding Chicago's spray paint ban, the Seventh Circuit,
applied a rational basis standard of review and noted that Chicago's
reasoning behind the need for a complete ban "is not subject to
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' '48 The court also noted
that, "[a]vailability of spray paint in the suburbs, and of undercoating
in Chicago, reduces the effectiveness of the statute, but a rational
legislature could conclude that some effect remains."49  In other
(1888).
41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 685/4 (2005); CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 4-64-194
(2005).
43. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 4-64-194; see Dennis Conrad, Associated Press,
Total Bidi Cigarette Ban has Teens Primarily in Mind (Dec. 12, 2000),
http://www.no-smoking.org/dec00/12-12-00-3.html.
44. 720 ILL. COMI. STAT. 685/4.
45. Nat'l Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir.
1995).
46. See City of Portland v. Jackson, 826 P.2d 37 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Soc'y
of Plastics Indus., Irc. v. County of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991).
47. ANN ARBOR, MICH., ORDINANCE 28-05 (2005); DULUTH, MINN., CODE
§ 28.61 (2005).
48. Nat'l Paint & Coatings Ass'n, 45 F.3d at 1127 (emphasis added)
(quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993)).
49. Id. at 1128.
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words, to support a ban of products like spray paint, Styrofoam, and
mercury thermometers, such ban need not be based on extensive
research nor be fully effective. It simply must be rationally related to
a legitimate governmental concern.
Similarly, bans on nutritionally deficient foods, such as sodas,
are likely to withstand legal challenge under the rational basis
standard. This is true even if the science supporting such a ban is
incomplete and the potential effect of the ban will be insufficient to
fully solve the growing problem of childhood overweight and
obesity.
50
Product bans, while not targeting commercial speech directly,
can impact marketing in two ways. First, basic tenets of capitalism
suggest that if a product cannot be sold legally, retailers will not
waste money marketing it. Second, banning the sale of a product in
a particular place or jurisdiction allows for the regulation of commer-
cial speech about that product since the speech would concern
unlawful activity and thus fail the first prong of Central Hudson.
5 1
Enforcing an outright product ban is relatively simple. It should
be fairly easy to determine if a retailer is selling a banned product or
not.
b. Retailing restrictions
Short of banning a product, a state or local government may
impose regulations restricting many aspects of how a product is
sold. 52 Every facet of a product's sale is potentially subject to regu-
lation: when, where, how, to whom, etc. As with product bans, the
legitimacy of such government regulations is usually tested under the
lenient rational basis standard. 3
50. In contrast, in order to uphold a ban on commercial speech about
unhealthful foods, science proving a substantial link between food marketing
and ill-health would need to be convincing, and the effect of the ban would
need to be substantial. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357 (2002). Further, the government would need to show that other nonspeech
laws are unlikely to accomplish the same result. Id. at 372.
51. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
52. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOBACCO
INFORMATION AND PREVENTION SOURCE, MINOR'S ACCESS TO TOBACCO
FACT SHEET (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2000/factsheets/fact
sheet minor.htm.
53. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462 (1981).
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Retailing restrictions are commonplace in tobacco control. 54 In
fact, all states limit youth access to tobacco by prohibiting tobacco
sales to minors.55  Other common access limitations include
prohibiting the self-service display of tobacco16 and limiting the
distribution of free samples of tobacco products.
57
Retailing limits can take many forms: age limits, time-of-day
limits, product display limits, and location limits. 58 For example,
communities could require that candy or other products be restricted
to certain locations in a retail outlet. Some supermarkets already
have candy-free check-out lanes to assist parents that are trying to
encourage healthful eating habits for their children.5 9 Other limits
could include a requirement that candy be placed above a certain
height (e.g., higher than a child's eye ,level) or even behind the
counter. Similar to the common restrictions on self-service displays
for tobacco products, such limits discourage impulse purchases and
reduce the opportunity for shoplifting by youth.
6
Another idea related to product shelving is to require that
product packaging, such as cereal boxes, be positioned so that the
side of the box bearing nutritional information faces out toward the
consumer, ensuring that these facts are at least as readily viewable as
the alluring color imagery typical of cereal boxes. Alternately, if
products contain more than a specified percentage of calories from
sugar or fat, they could be placed above a certain height in the retail
outlet, resulting in cereals with the most sugar being placed on the
54. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 52.
55. ld.
56. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22960, 22962 (West 2005)
(prohibiting access to cigarettes without the assistance of a clerk); see also
American Lung Association, Database on State Legislated Actions on Tobacco
Usage (2005), http://www.virtualsql.com/abcqxyz/dev/lungusa/StateLegislate
Action.asp.
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West 2005) (prohibiting selling or
giving tobacco products to minors); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118950
(West 1996 & Supp. 2005) (prohibiting samples and coupons for cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco)..
58. See American Lung Association, supra note 56.
59. See, e.g., Maureen Sangiorgio, The Top Family-Friendly Supermarket
Chains, CHILD, Aug. 2003, at 153.
60. Rebecca E. Lee et al., The Relation Between Community Bans of Self-
Service Tobacco Displays and Store Environment and Between Tobacco
Accessibility and Merchant Incentives, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2019, 2019,
2021 (2001).
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highest row of an aisle. Such hypothetical restrictions are legally
permissible because they impose limits on the product display and
location rather than the commercial message.
61
In theory, a law limiting product access could incorporate
multiple simultaneous restrictions. For example, the "City of
Wellbeing" could enact a law that limits access to sodas and
prohibits the sale of soda: (i) to anyone under the age of twelve; (ii)
to anyone during the hour before school begins and the hour after
school ends; (iii) via a vending machine; and (iv) on school grounds
or within 500 feet of a school.
Some access limits can be difficult to abide by or enforce. For
example, how would a vendor determine whether a purchaser was
younger than twelve, assuming most twelve-year-olds do not carry
identification? Moreover, how would a vendor know when school
starts and ends? Although a government may have ample power to
regulate access to a product, the regulation may be invalid if it fails
to provide a vendor with sufficient certainty regarding the appli-
cation of the law.6 2 However, such potential legal infirmities are
primarily drafting issues and do not call into question a government's
basic authority to regulate product access.
63
Beyond controlling the basic facets of a sale, a state or local
government may impose additional conditions on sales to limit a
61. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551-552, 569 (2001)
(upholding Massachusetts' restrictions on the self-service display of tobacco
products and finding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
left significant power in the hands of states to impose generally applicable
zoning regulations and to regulate conduct with respect to cigarette use and
sales); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 496 (1982) (holding a local ordinance requiring a license to sell drug
paraphernalia and restricting the manner of marketing such products did not
"appreciably limit[] [the retailer]'s communication of information . . ").
62. A law is vague if persons of "common intelligence must necessarily
guess.., its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The Court has deemed such laws
unconstitutionally xVague. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948)
(reversing a vendor's conviction for possession of certain publications because
the relevant statute was unconstitutionally vague).
63. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) (holding that an overly
broad statutory ban on child pornography, when narrowly construed by the
judiciary, is constitutional despite the risk of "careless drafting" by "legislators
who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without [the]
significant cost" of invalidated laws).
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product's detrimental effect on public health. A common, and
potentially comprehensive, regulation imposed on tobacco retailers
in some states and local communities is that a tobacco retailer must
obtain a license before selling tobacco. 64 Typically, violating any
tobacco law puts the license at risk.65 Other common conditions, all
of which are in effect in California, include requiring: (i) cigarettes
be sold in a minimum quantity; 66 (ii) age of purchase signs be posted
at retail points of sale;67 and (iii) free samples of tobacco products
not be distributed on public grounds or on private grounds open to
the public.68 Again, the legal test for such creative restrictions is the
lenient rational basis test.
69
Similarly, many creative conditions attached to the sale of
unhealthful food should easily survive a rational basis review. A
local government might require that unhealthful fast food outlets,
however they might be defined, meet the following conditions in
order to legally sell fast food:
70
* Unhealthful fast food purveyors may not distribute toys or
other promotional items (e.g., "Happy Meal" toys) in
64. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22970-79 (West Supp. 2005)
(regulating retailers' wholesalers, distributors, manufacturers, and importers);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-285b (West Supp. 2005) (regulating cigarette
manufacturers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-287 to -288 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005) (regulating cigarette dealers and distributors). See generally
American Lung Association, Database on State Legislated Actions on Tobacco
Issues, http://slati.lungusa.org/search.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2005)
(presenting a comprehensive list by selecting a state and following the
"Licensing Requirements" link).
65. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-295 (2000) (providing that any
violation of statutory regulations on the sale of cigarettes may be grounds for
the suspension or revocation of a license).
66. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308.2 (West 2005) (prohibiting single
cigarette sales); CAL. PENAL CODE § 308.3 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring a
minimum pack size).
67. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22952 (West 2005) (requiring age of
purchase signs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (c) (West Supp. 2005) (stating
penalties for failing to post signs); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 6902(a) (2005)
(stating format requirements for age of purchase signs).
68. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 118950(b) (West 1996 & West Supp.
2005) (prohibiting samples and coupons for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco).
69. See supra Part II.A, B.1(a)-(b).
70. See generally Marice Ashe et al., Land Use Planning and the Control of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Fast Food Restaurants, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1404, 1407, (2003).
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connection with their meals. The rational basis for this
prohibition would be that giving away toys encourages
unhealthful eating. Restricting toys is not restricting
speech.
* Unhealthful fast food purveyors must offer nutritious
alternatives to unhealthful meals wherever they sell their
food. The rational basis for this requirement would be that
the public will eat more healthful food if nutritious options
are available with the same convenience as unhealthful fast
food.
* Unhealthful fast food purveyors may not provide drive-
through service. The rational basis for this prohibition
would be that the public will eat more healthful food if only
healthy restaurants are able to lure customers with the
convenience of a drive-through window. Further, drive-
through' services encourage a sedentary lifestyle that only
compounds the problems of consuming unhealthful fast
food.
* Food sold as a complete "meal" package must not exceed
maximum limits on calories, fat, salt, and other potentially
unhealthful components. The rational basis for this require-
ment would be that restaurants selling single meals ex-
ceeding the maximum daily recommended intake of certain
components encourage unhealthful eating.
Like basic sales restrictions, creative retailing restrictions could
substantially affect product advertising. For example, if toys cannot
be distributed with unhealthful fast food, one would expect to see the
powerful Happy Meal marketing tool applied to healthful meals
instead.
c. The land use angle
Land use authority, usually expressed through city planning, is a
fundamental power of local governments. 71 Land use regulations
also are typically reviewed under the rational basis test.
72
Land use has its roots as a, public health tool used to promote
sanitation and improve urban environments.73 In light of this history,
71. Id. at 1404.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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local governments can invoke their land use powers to combat the
increasing prevalence of poor nutrition.74 In the area of tobacco
control, for instance, some communities have enacted laws that
prohibit tobacco retailers from locating within 1,000 feet of a school
or other youth-sensitive location.
7 5
Other communities require certain businesses, such as liquor
stores, to receive a conditional use permit (CUP) prior to opening.
76
In the CUP process, the local government can factor in a
community's needs in deciding whether to allow businesses to
open.77 The process also offers the local government an opportunity
to impose conditions on businesses allowed to open.78 For example,
a CUP for a liquor store might include provisions for increased
lighting, a ban on pay phones, and anti-loitering requirements aimed
at curtailing drug dealing. 79 Local governments can apply similar
restrictions to unhealthful fast food outlets, guided by at least two
purposes: "(1) to encourage restaurants to improve the nutritional
74. Id. at 1407.
75. For example, significant tobacco retailers in Marin County, California
must be:
located [at lea~t] one thousand feet from a parcel occupied by the
following uses:
(1) Public or private kindergarten, elementary, middle, junior high or
high schools;
(2) Licensed child day-care facility or preschool other than a small or
large family daycare home;
(3) Public playground or playground area in a public park (e.g., a
public park with equipment such as swings and seesaws, baseball
diamonds or basketball courts);
(4) Youth or teen center;
(5) Public community center or recreation center;
(6) Arcade;
(7) Public park;
(8) Public library, or
(9) Houses of worship conducting youth programs or youth oriented
activities.
MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE tit. 221, ch. 22.681, § 1l0(b) (2002); see also
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR., PUB. HEALTH INST., MODEL LAND USE
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE LOCATION AND OPERATIONS OF TOBACCO
RETAILERS 7-8 (2002), http://talc.phlaw.org/pdffiles/0014.pdf.
76. Ashe et al., supra note 70, at 1405.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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quality of their food or at least provide alternative healthier meals,
and (2) to displace those fast food outlets that do not improve in an
effort to open the marketplace to competition from healthier restau-
rants."
80
Because land use is principally a local concern, land use controls
provide an important means for advancing local-level policy.81 Land
use regulations are particularly well suited for curtailing certain
kinds of business activity based upon proximity to other businesses
or locations of concern, such as schools. For example, a land use law
could prevent fast food outlets from opening within 500 feet of a
school or another fast food outlet, and it could limit the per capita
number of fast food outlets in a community.
82
2. Product Standards
In addition to product bans and sale regulations, product
standards may regulate a given set of product characteristics.
Generally, product standards are subject to rational basis review.
83
As part of its comprehensive tobacco control program, New
York recently adopted a product standard approach by imposing a
fire safety standard for all cigarettes sold in the state. 84 The require-
ment was designed to reduce fires caused by smoldering cigarettes.
85
In New York, it is illegal to sell cigarettes that do not meet the
standard.86 To the extent that certain food product compositions are
known or suspected to be harmful (e.g., food with high levels of
added sugars or fat), under similar legislation, the sale of products
that do not meet particular standards could be illegal to sell or sales
could be limited to certain circumstances.
Product standards may be difficult to develop without a clear
understanding of what makes a deficient product. Product standards
can also present enforcement problems, especially where product
80. Id. at 1407 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 1405.
82. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR., supra note 75, at 8-9 (giving
an example of language imposing similar land use restrictions in the tobacco
context).
83. See supra Part II.B.1(a).
84. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, §§ 429.1, 429.4 (2003).
85. Id. § 429.4.
86. Id. § 429.1.
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testing is required to determine a violation of the standard.87  In
addition, the public may automatically perceive a product to be
"safe" 88 simply because it meets a standard. For example, food
industry use of healthy-sounding terms like "diet" or "light" can have
a profound effect on public perception that foods labeled such are
healthy.89 Product standards also might not prevent manufacturers
from engineering products that meet standards yet still pose the same
health threat. For example, tobacco companies learned to manu-
facture filters with tiny holes to fool the government's smoke-testing
machines into measuring reduced carcinogens. 90 In the real world,
the smoker's fingers or lips cover the holes, resulting in a more
concentrated and deadlier smoke stream.
9 1
3. Taxes
Governmenttaxes on tobacco products represent the centerpiece
of the tobacco control movement because tobacco taxes serve the
dual purposes of helping to deter smoking directly and
simultaneously providing needed resources for anti-tobacco efforts.
92
The taxes help deter smoking by raising the cost of tobacco, which
has been shown to be the most effective approach to lowering
smoking rates, especially among youth, who are generally sensitive
to price increases. 93 The second purpose is achieved when a portion
87. E.g., id. § 429.4 (requiring product testing).
88. "For many, although certainly not all Americans, hearing that the Food
and Drug Administration has approved a particular food or drug increases their
confidence in its safety." Peggy G. Lemaux, Cooperative Extension Specialist
in Plant Biotechnology, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Lecture at the Second
BioValley Life Sciences Conference on The Future of Plant Engineering (Nov.
5, 1999), http://ucbiotech.org/resources/biotech/talks/crops/FREIBURG.html.
89. Andrea Lynn, TV Confuses Children About Which Foods are Healthy,
New Study Finds, June 17, 2005, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/
06/050614235942.htm.
90. Martin Jarvis, Imperial Cancer Research Fund, Why Low Tar
Cigarettes Don't Work and How the Tobacco Industry Has Fooled the
Smoking Public (Mar. 18, 1999), http://www.ash.org.uk/html/regulation/html/
big-one.html.
91. Id.
92. See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Higher Cigarette Taxes: Reduce
Smoking, Save Lives, Save Money, http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/prices
(last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
93. Sherry Emery et al., Does Cigarette Price Influence Adolescent
Experimentation?, 20 J. HEALTH EcoN. 261, 261-270 (2001); Jeffrey E. Harris
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of the tax revenue from tobacco is used to fund a comprehensive
tobacco control program, as is done in California.
94
The power to tax is a fundamental power of government.
95
Although potentially broad, the taxing authority of local
governments is often limited by state law.96 Limits on state and local
taxing authority vary from state to state. 97  For example, in
California, the state's power to tax is restricted by constitutional
provisions added through California's citizen initiative process.
98
& Sandra W. Chan, The Continuum-of-Addiction: Cigarette Smoking in
Relation to Price Among Americans Aged 15-29, ELECTRONIC HEALTH ECON.
LETrERS, Sept. 1998, at 3-12, available at www.mit.edu/people/jeffrey/Harris
ChanHel98.pdf.; John A. Tauras et al., Effects of Price and Access Laws on
Teenage Smoking Initiation: A National Longitudinal Analysis, IMPACTEEN,
Apr. 2001, at 3, available at http://www.impacteen.org/researchproducts.htm;
John A. Tauras, Public Policy and Smoking Cessation Among Young Adults in
the United States, 68 HEALTH POL'Y 321, 324-26 (2004); Frank Chaloupka &
Rosalie Pacula, An Examination of Gender and Race Differences in Youth
Smoking Responsiveness to Price and Tobacco Control Policies 1-15 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6541, 1998), available at
http://tigger.uic.edu/-fjc; William N. Evans & Lynn X. Huang, Cigarette
Taxes and Teen Smoking: New Evidence from Panels of Repeated Cross-
Sections 2-3 (Univ. of Md., Working Paper, 1998) available at http://
www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/evans/wrkpap.htm; Eric Lindblom, Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids, Raising Cigarette Taxes Reduces Smoking, Especially
Among Kids (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact
sheets/pdf/0146.pdf (citing Frank Chaloupka, Macro-Social Influences: The
Effects of Prices and Tobacco Control Policies on the Demand for Tobacco
Products, 1 NICOTINE AND TOBACCO RES. 77, 78 (1999)).
94. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., Proposition 99 and the Legislative Mandate
for the California Tobacco Control Program, http://www.dhs.ca.gov/tobacco/
html/about.htrn (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
In November 1988, California voters approved the California Tobacco
Health Protection Act of 1988, also known as Prop 99. This
referendum increased the state cigarette tax by 25 cents per pack and
added an equivalent amount on other tobacco products. The new
revenues were earmarked for programs to reduce smoking, to provide
health care services to indigents, to support tobacco-related research,
and to fund resource programs for the environment.
Id.; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 104350-104875 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2005).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; CAL. CONST. art. XIII §§ 1-2; CAL.
CONST. art. XI, § 5; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 37100.5 (West 1988).
96. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, C-D.
97. Compare id., with N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
98. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (having been passed as Prop. 13); CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIC-D (having been passed as Prop. 218).
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However, there may be legal ways to avoid limits on taxing
authority. For example, regulatory fees in California are free of the
restrictions imposed on taxes and can be used to accomplish the dual
purposes of a public health tax, deterring product use and generating
resources to mitigate product harm.99 While imposing taxes and fees
raise important legal issues, the greatest obstacles to increased taxes
and fees are most often political. Convincing legislative bodies to
exercise their power to tax or to impose a fee is usually the crucial
challenge.
A state or a local jurisdiction with the power to impose a product
tax could impose a tax on nutritionally deficient food, such as
soda.'00 The exact amount of a tax could be calculated to provide a
measured deterrence to purchasing the product, and the tax proceeds
ideally would be used to fund programs aimed at reducing the public
health burden associated with unhealthful foods.
As politically challenging as taxes are to impose, the potential
benefit of taxes and fees cannot be overstated. Every option pro-
posed or discussed in this Article requires significant resources to
implement and enforce. 10 The ongoing success of California's
comprehensive tobacco control program would not exist without the
state's dedicated tobacco tax.1
0 2
99. See, e.g., Sin'clair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350
(Cal. 1997).
100. A tax to curtail product usage is more likely to survive judicial scrutiny
than a restriction on speech. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 507 (1996) (holding that a state ban on advertising liquor prices in order
to curb consumption was unconstitutional).
[Rhode Island] ... cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on
speech be no more extensive than necessary. It is perfectly obvious
that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any
restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal
of promoting temperance. As the State's own expert conceded, higher
prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased
taxation.
Id.
101. See Cal. Dep-t of Health Servs., supra note 94.
102. Id.
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C. Regulating Product Marketing by Agreement:
Binding & Nonbinding Limits on Commercial Speech
The First Amendment provides protection from government
interference with speech. 10 3 It does not guarantee an absolute right to
speak or preclude agreements to limit one's own speech.10 4 In fact,
private parties :can voluntarily negotiate agreements among
themselves or with government agencies to limit the speech rights
the parties would otherwise possess. 105 This Section explores the
types of agreements that limit commercial speech. Such agreements
can take the form of enforceable contracts, which include litigation
settlements, or they simply can be unenforceable understandings
secured only by the integrity of the parties making the agreement. 
06
The types of agreements considered here include:
1. Private binding contracts between one business or
organization and another;
2. Public binding contracts between the government and a
business or organization;
3. Private litigation settlements in which the government is
not a party;
4. Public litigation settlements in which the government is
a plaintiff;
5. Private nonbinding agreements between one business or
organization and another; and
6. Public nonbinding agreements between the government
and a business or organization.
1. Private Binding Contracts
When private parties contract to limit speech, the First
Amendment may not be implicated. 10 7 As a result, contracts to limit
speech are generally enforceable. 0 8 Examples of contractual speech
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104. See Erie Telecomm. Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir.
1988) (noting that "constitutional rights may be waived under particular
circumstances").
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1099.
107. See, e.g., id. at 1084.
108. See, e.g., id. at 1094. When contracts restricting speech are not
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limitations include nondisclosure agreements, nondisparagement
clauses, and confidentiality provisions.
A common form of contract in which an advertising prohibition
might appear is in the landlord and tenant context. For example, a
private property owner might lease his field to a concert promoter.
As part of the lease agreement, the property owner could prohibit the
promoter from accepting tobacco advertising or sponsorship of the
concert. 109 If the promoter violated the contract, the property owner
could sue in court and potentially obtain damages and a court order
requiring that any tobacco ads be removed. Tobacco control
advocates have focused on influencing such private contracts as a
means to eliminate tobacco sponsorship at sporting events such as
rodeos and NASCAR races. 110 In the nutrition context, one can
imagine a landlord of a strip mall being influenced by nutrition
advocates to restrict the window advertising for unhealthful foods by
the mall's tenants.
2. Public Binding Contracts
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that there are limits on
how state or local governments can generally regulate advertising on
private property, such regulations must pass the demanding Central
Hudson test."' However, the way a government regulates the use of
private property is different from the way a government controls the
use of its own property. 112 This distinction between the "regulatory"
interests (i.e., interfering with private relationships) and
"proprietary" interests (i.e., managing public property) is key
because a government entity has a greater ability to regulate
advertising on its own property."1
3
enforceable it is usually because of some overriding public policy consid-
eration, other than the First Amendment, such as a public policy supporting
whistle blowing. See id. at 1096; Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 791 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1983); Brian Stryker Weinstein, In Defense of Jeffrey Wigand. A
First Amendment Challenge to the Enforcement of Employee Confidentiality
Agreements Against Whistleblowers, 49 S.C. L. REV. 129, 141-42 (1997).
109. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
110. See notes 167-71 and accompanying notes.
111. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
112. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992).
113. See, e.g., Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830
(1992) (affirming for the reasons expressed in the concurring opinions of Int'l
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First, as a proprietor, a government has broad latitude to decline
advertising or sponsorship when soliciting ads if the government
itself will be the speaker. 14 The government is the speaker when,
for instance, it prepares a visitors' guide to local attractions. As the
proprietor of the publication, the government is not restricting the
speech of third parties but is itself acting as a speaker.
115
A second constitutionally permissible limitation that govern-
ments can make via a contract are restrictions on advertising by
private parties in connection with their use of government
property. 116 Like the example of the private landowner renting a
field for a concert in Section (1) above, the government also has the
ability to restrict advertising by private parties in relation to
government property.1 17 That is, besides the Central Hudson analy-
sis, focusing on the commercial nature of speech, the Supreme Court
also has developed a "forum" analysis, which focuses on the nature
of the traditional use of public property as a venue for public
speaking. 118 Under the "forum" analysis, the level of protection
afforded to speech on public property depends on the nature of the
property at issue.
119
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672). The government's proprie-
tary interest also bolsters its position when regulating ads on public school
grounds or on the public airwaves. See supra Part II.B. 1(c).
114. Memorandum from the Ctr. for the Study of Law & Enforcement Policy
Pac. Inst. for Research and Evaluation to the Ctr. on Alcohol Mktg. & Youth
(July 2004), available at http://camy.org/action/pdf/CommercialSpeech
Memo.pdf.
115. See infra Part II.D.
116. Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. The "forum" analysis begins with determining the nature of the forum
in which the speech occurs. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074
(9th Cir. 2001). The United States Supreme Court has "identified three types
of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government
designation, and the nonpublic forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). "[T]he two main categories of
fora are public (where strict scrutiny applies) and non-public (where a more
lenient 'reasonableness' standard governs)." Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074. If a
forum is not a traditional public forum (for example, meeting hall, park, street
comer, public thoroughfare), it is a nonpublic forum unless the government
intentionally designates it as public. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1999). On designating the
forum, "[t]he government does not create a public forum by... permitting
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If the property is a place that is usually opened to speakers, the
property is a "traditional public forum" (e.g., a town square). 120 In
this case, the government must pass the strict scrutiny test if it limits
the content of what individuals may say on the property because the
government will' be infringing on a fundamental right.' 2 1 The
government must pass the Central Hudson test if it limits the content
of commercial speech on the property. 122 If the property is not a
"traditional public forum" (e.g., a government business office), the
government has greater freedom to selectively grant some speakers
access to the government's own property while denying others. 1
23
The forum analysis doctrine generally has not been applied in
the tobacco control context, perhaps because the most obvious
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Further, a designated public
forum may be opened only for some purposes, such as First Amendment uses,
but remain a nonpublic forum for others. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720, 730 (1990). In those situations, "regulation of the reserved nonpublic
uses would still require application of the reasonableness test." Id. Evidence
of government intent may include a written policy or conduct sufficient to
show the government's actual intent. Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v.
Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1991). As to
government restrictions in traditional public forums and designated public
forums, speech is afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection.
Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074. In these fora, non-commercial speech is subject to
strict scrutiny while commercial speech is subject to the lesser standard set
forth in Central Hudson. Id; Cent.Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
Government restrictions in nonpublic forums and limited public forums,
"[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal
operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or
license," will not be subjected to heightened review. Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678. "[H]owever, the policies and practices
governing access to... [government] advertising space must not be arbitrary,
capricious, or invidious." Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
303 (1974). "The Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic
forum need only be reasonable." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808. Therefore, if a
"decision to limit access [to a nonpublic forum], whether wise or unwise, is
reasonable and not an effort at viewpoint discrimination, ... [it does] not
violate the first amendment ...." Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc., 941
F.2d at 830.
120. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074.
121. Id.
122. Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Pa. State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 863 (3d Cir.
1984).
123. Id.
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forums one would wish to control, public schools and broadcast
media, already exclude tobacco marketing. 24 But a forum analysis
may be important in determining that a commercial speech
restriction is subject not to the Central Hudson test but to an
alternative test specific to the forum at issue, such as public schools
and broadcast media. 25  Nutrition advocates should carefully
consider whether regulating food marketing in other nonpublic and
limited public forums might form the basis for meaningful policy
intervention. Properly crafted food advertising restrictions in these
forums should receive a more lenient review than that required by
the Central Hudion test. However, it remains to be seen if courts
will perceive the logic in first using a forum analysis before
employing, if necessary, the Central Hudson test.
3. Private Litigation Settlements
Settlements of civil cases between two or more private parties
are essentially private binding contracts. 26  Just like private
contracts, 127 settlements can contain speech restrictions that are
enforceable in court. 128  A common speech provision of private
settlements is a confidentiality clause in which the parties agree to
keep the terms of the settlement contract secret. 129  Speech
restrictions in settlements can also target advertising.'3 °  For
example, in a settlement with the Center for Environmental Health,
124. See Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, § Ill(a).
125. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996) (plurality opinion) (upholding restrictions on programming
imposed by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act as
a means of protecting children from indecent programming); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,: 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (stating that school authorities
have greater powerito control speech, in accord with their "basic educational
mission," than would be the case in other contexts); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (stating that "[t]he ease with which children may
obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in
Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting").
126. 15A AM. JUR. 2d Compromise and Settlement § 18 (2005).
127. See infra Part II.C.1.
128. See Laurie Kratky Dord, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion:
South Carolina's New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L.
REv. 791, 799-800 (2004).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., 2 Firms Stamp Out Lawsuit with Free Anti-Smoking
Billboards, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 1998, at A13.
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two of California's largest billboard companies agreed to pull down
tobacco billboards and donate 500 months of billboard space to anti-
tobacco ads.'
31
A prerequisite for a settlement is having a potentially valid legal
claim. Many high profile tobacco cases have been based on the
personal injuries suffered by smokers and to those exposed to
secondhand smoke. 132 Likewise, in the nutrition context, analogous
personal injury cases could be brought, and a few have been, 133 to
compensate the injured for the harm done to them by the food
industry's products and practices.
Beyond personal injury claims, all states have consumer
protection laws that potentially could be used as a basis for a private
lawsuit. 134 In California, for instance, laws that prohibit deceptive
advertising and unfair competition allow certain private parties to sue
for violations of the law. 35 Tobacco control advocates have re-
peatedly used these laws to hold the tobacco industry accountable for
deceptive marketing practices, especially predatory marketing to
children.
136
In 1992, for example, advocates brought a lawsuit under
California's unfair competition law against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., alleging that the company's "Old Joe Camel" advertising
campaign targeted minors "for the purpose of inducing and
increasing their illegal purchases of cigarettes."' 137 It is illegal in
California for minors to buy or possess tobacco products. 38 The
California Supreme Court found that advertising aimed at such
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995),
reversed, 84 F.3d 734; Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
133. See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508
(2d Cir. 2005) (vacating the district court's dismissal and remanding for further
proceedings).
134. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 2005).
135. Id. A recent California ballot initiative, Proposition 64, amended
California Business and Professions Code section 17204 by tightening the
standing requirements for private plaintiffs but not government plaintiffs. Id.
§ 17204 (Supp. 2005).
136. See, e.g., Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal.
1994).
137. Id. at 78.
138. Id. at 80.
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unlawful conduct encourages both vendors and minors to violate the
law. 1 39 R.J. Reynolds decided to settle the case rather than make
further appeals. 140 This landmark settlement directly led to the end
of the cartoon-based and kid-focused Old Joe Camel advertising
campaign. 141
Although Mangini involved advertising for a product that was
illegal for children, lawsuits could be initiated against food
advertising that allegedly is "unfair, deceptive, untrue, or
misleading,"'142 depending on the language of the individual state's
consumer protection law. A lawsuit could focus on what is "unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading" to children of different ages who
are the primary targets of the advertising (for example, five-year-olds
or ten year olds) in an attempt to have the courts, rather than direct
government regulation, limit food marketers' advertising practices.
Under California's consumer protection laws, a case was brought in
the late 1970s claiming that the marketing of certain sugary cereals,
including Alpha Bits, Honeycomb, Fruity Pebbles, Sugar Crisp, and
Cocoa Pebbles, was false or misleading. 143  The case eventually
settled, and $1 million of the settlement went toward initiating the
California Adolescent and Nutrition and Fitness Program
("CANFit"), a statewide, nonprofit organization that works to
improve the nutrition and physical activity of low-income youth. 1
44
Litigation settlements from potentially valid claims in personal
injury or consumer protection cases could be used in almost limitless
ways to achieve marketing restrictions that would be unconstitutional
139. Id. at 82. Mangini was decided on federal preemption grounds. Id. at
74. It did not involve any First Amendment issues. See id. at 76. R.J.
Reynolds argued that the action violated the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA). Id. at 75. The court in Mangini, decided prior to
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), found that restrictions on
tobacco advertising were not preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 74.
140. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Co., No. 939359 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1997)
(settlement agreement), available at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/
hotdocs/mangini.htm.
141. Id.
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2005); id. § 17500 (providing
a criminal penalty for false or misleading advertising).
143. See Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673
P.2d 660, 663-64 (Cal. 1983).
144. See California Adolescent Nutrition and Fitness Program, About Us,
http://www.canfit.org/about-us.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
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if imposed by law. However, barriers to a litigation approach exist,
including potential difficulties forming a valid claim and the extreme
cost of litigating against a powerful industry. The tobacco industry,
for example, employs a "scorched earth"'145 litigation policy designed
to deplete a plaintiff's resources far before a judgment is ever
reached on the merits of a case. 146 To date, there are too few cases
against the food industry to accurately predict what litigation strategy
that industry would employ, but one should expect that the food
industry is well aware that the "scorched earth" Iolicy historically
has been very successful for the tobacco industry.
4. Public Litigation Settlements
Like private litigants, when the government sues a private party,
the lawsuit usually is resolved with a settlement. 148  Government
settlements have played an extremely important role in tobacco
control. 4 9  Most notably, the attorneys general of several states
reached a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with leading
cigarette manufacturers based on the theory that the manufacturers
should be held liable for past costs to the government due to
smoking. 50 The MSA requires manufacturers to pay billions of
dollars to the plaintiff states.' 5' The MSA also contains important
provisions specifically limiting cigarette manufacturers' speech.'
52
For example, in the MSA, tobacco companies agreed to give up
cigarette billboards and to forgo cigarette advertising directed at
youth. 153 As seen in Lorillard,154 the states would have had great
145. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], TOWARDS HEALTH WITH JUSTICE:
LITIGATION AND PUBLIC INQUIRY AS TOOLS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 18,
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/finaljordan-report
.pdf (prepared by D. Douglas Blanke).
146. Id. (quoting Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 414, 421
(D.N.J. 1993).
147. Id.
148. Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don't Know Can Kill You!,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 240.
149. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 12.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. § III.
153. Id.
154. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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difficulty in achieving these results through regulation alone. 1
55
Beyond the MSA, tobacco control routinely employs govern-
ment settlements to achieve public health goals. 156 For example, in
Fresno County, California, a deputy district attorney settles virtually
all of his cases against retailers found violating California's laws
prohibiting tobacco sales to minors.1 57 Through settlements, he can
obtain agreements tailored to the particular violation, agreements that
usually involve a monetary penalty, and can include the removal or
reduction of tobacco advertising at a particular store. 158 Likewise, a
city prosecutor for the City of San Diego, California, frequently
requests that restrictions on speech be part of a tobacco law
violator's probation requirements. 159 In both scenarios, the govern-
ment is obtaining a voluntary agreement to restrict speech, not
mandating the restriction.
Government settlements of alleged legal violations can be a
particularly effective way to achieve speech restrictions in areas most
in need of them. Nutrition advocates should keep in mind the
opportunities setilements provide when enforcing existing laws or
when crafting new ones. For example, a potentially valid claim
against a food manufacturer for its marketing on school campuses
(either in violation of existing law, or in violation of a law advocates
enact to protect school children) could, in theory, result in a
voluntary settlement agreement by the food manufacturer to limit or
change its television advertising. A more imaginative approach
might be to require settling food manufacturers to meet specified
targets, such as reducing childhood obesity rates to those found in the
United States thirty years ago and allowing the industry to settle on
the most efficient methods of achieving those targets. 1
60
155. See, e.g., id. at 557.
156. Telephone interview with Roger Wilson, Deputy Dist. Att'y, in Fresno
County, Cal. (Feb. 9, 2005).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Telephone interview with Joan McNamara, City Prosecutor, in San
Diego, Cal. (Jan. 26, 2005).
160. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A New Diet Plan, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 10,
2005, at 1-2, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sugarmans/
Sugarman%20Legal%2OTimes%20 1-10-05.pdf.
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Settlements are not a perfect solution. The agreement reached in
the MSA serves to highlight some of the shortcomings of
settlements. At its core, a settlement is always a compromise,
meaning all parfies obtain something they want. Many tobacco
control advocates remain skeptical about the value of settlement
agreements with tobacco companies. 161 Along with its notable
achievements, the MSA offers tobacco companies a safe harbor for
certain activities and practices. 162 For example, the MSA permits a
tobacco company to sponsor one event per year. 163 That particular
compromise points out yet another shortcoming of a settlement-
interpretation. Does "one event per year" mean one weekend
sporting event, as some tobacco control advocates believe? 64 No, in
fact, it means a year-long series of racing events held under the
umbrella event name the "Winston Cup." Tobacco companies
also sponsor individual athletes, race cars, and stock (such as rodeo
bulls) to extend this allowance in the MSA into a near-continuous
presence at many sporting events.
166
5. Private Nonbinding Agreements
Tobacco advocates have influenced private binding contracts
with the goal of eliminating tobacco sponsorship from sporting167 18
venues such as NASCAR racing and rodeos.16  In both cases,
161. Patricia A. McDaniel & Ruth E. Malone, Understanding Philip
Morris's Pursuit of US. Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO
CONTROL 193, 193 (2005) (arguing that Philip Morris uses regulation to
rehabilitate its image in order to appear socially responsible).
162. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 12, § III(c)(2).
163. 1d.
164. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goddard v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 75 P.3d
1075, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
165. See id. at 1076.
166. See id. R.J. Reynolds argued that the disputed provision of the MSA
allowed its signs to be posted at the raceway every day of every year that it
sponsored a series. 1d. at 1078. The trial court ordered the removal of all
outdoor advertising signs that exceeded the authorized event-related window at
either raceway. Id. The appellate court concluded, as did the trial court, that
the subject language as a matter of law referred to the events at each site, not to
multiple sites. Id. at 1080.
167. "Now it's the Nextel Cup series and no longer the Winston Cup. Out
are the cigarettes, in are wireless phone networks." Editorial, Racing's
Evolution: 20th Year at Reborn Watkins Glen Keeps up with NASCAR's
Changing Market, Faces, STAR-GAZETrE (Elmira, N.Y.), Aug. 14, 2005, at 12,
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advocates reached nonbinding agreements with the business decision
makers of NASCAR and local rodeos to reject any offer by tobacco
companies to sponsor the events. 169 Essentially, NASCAR and the
local rodeos declined to contract with tobacco companies.17
0
Tobacco control advocates also have influenced the private
contracts for advertisements that appear in many newspapers and
magazines.' 7 ' Through nonbinding agreements, advocates have been
able to eliminate the presence of tobacco ads in the following
publications: New York Times, San Jose Mercury News, Business
Week, and Reader's Digest.72 Again, the private organization made
the decision to exclude tobacco sponsorship. These restrictions on
speech are private restrictions, not government restrictions, and are
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 1
73
A great deal of food marketing appears in privately-controlled
venues such as television, grocery stores, and restaurants.
174
Nutrition advocates can try to limit junk-food marketing in these
venues by seeking nonbinding agreements with business decision
makers to decline, reduce, or better scrutinize ads for unhealthful
foods. Child-oriented television stations, for example, could volun-
tarily decline ads for unhealthful food during shows with a
significant viewing population under the age of ten. Private schools
could voluntarily agree to refuse any unhealthful food advertisements
on school grounds. Grocery stores could build upon a recent trend to
offer "family-friendly" checkout lines free of candy and other
unhealthful foods easily accessible to children.' 75  As mentioned
above, stores also could voluntarily agree to place kids' cereal boxes
on the shelf with only the nutrition information panel showing.
available at http://www.star-gazette.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/200508
14/OPINIONOI/508140308/1004.
168. The Buck Tobacco Sponsorship project Web site provides information
about how to eliminate tobacco sponsorship at rodeos and related events such
as rodeo-themed "bar nights." Buck Tobacco Sponsorship, http://www.buck
tobacco.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
169. Buck Tobacco Sponsorship, supra note 168; Editorial, supra note 167.
170. Buck Tobacco Sponsorship, supra note 168; Editorial, supra note 167.
i71. Tobacco.org, A List of Periodicals Which Refuse Tobacco Ads, http:/
/www.tobacco.org/Misc/tob-ad-mags.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
172. Id. (providing a more complete list of publications).
173. See supra Part II.C.1.
174. See Sangiorgio, supra note 59, at 153.
175. Id.
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Additionally, they could refuse slotting fees and other incentives to
place unhealthful food products at commercially desirable locations,
such as the end of the aisles.
Despite the' flexibility and creativity they allow, voluntary
policies have a significant flaw-they are unenforceable. Once the
impetus driving a voluntary agreement dissipates, be it through good
will, public pressure, the possibility of legislation, or the threat of
litigation, the party making the concessions has no reason to continue
abiding by the policy.1
76
6. Public Nonbinding Agreements
Like private advocates, the government can solicit voluntary
agreements from industry. In fact, the government is often more
successful than private parties at inducing industry to accept
voluntary policies, because it has the added power of enacting
legislation if a voluntary policy is insufficient or abandoned.
177
Voluntary agreements between industry and government are
frequently referred to as "self-regulation."'
78
Industry rating systems provide some of the best, and most
complex, examples of government-initiated, voluntary policies regu-
lating marketing and commercial speech. The examples of self-
regulation below originated with a fear of legislation. 179 When the
threat of government regulation lessens, so too does the effectiveness
of self-regulation.1
80
176. See generally Angela J. Campbell, Self Regulation and the Media, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 727 (1999) (stating that "effective enforcement of the
Television Code was hampered by... inadequate enforcement incentives").
177. See generally id. at 715 ("Often times, an industry will engage in self-
regulation in an attempt to stave off government regulation.").
178. See, e.g., id. at 750-55.
179. Id. at 751 (noting that the Supreme Court's approval of age classi-
fication systems prompted the movie industry to develop its own rating
system); id. at 753 (noting that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required
the FCC to take steps toward establishing a ratings system if the television
industry failed to implement a satisfactory system of its own); id. at 752
(noting that the Software Publishers Association "announced its intent to create
its own rating and warning system" on the first day of legislative hearings
about video game standards).
180. See id. at 727.
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a. Movie ratings
Almost every moviegoer is familiar with the Motion Picture
Association of America's (MPAA's) movie rating system.181 The
MPAA rates movies with the designation of either G, PG, PG-13, R,
or NC-17.182 The ratings directly relate to the appropriateness of the
movie's content for children. 83 No law requires the ratings system
to be enforced. 184 Theater owners decide how strictly to enforce the
system. 1
8 5
One novel idea in tobacco control is to tap into the existing
movie rating system and convince the MPAA to consider if and how
smoking is portrayed in movies. For example, one proposed
guideline provides that, "[a]ny film that shows or implies tobacco
should be rated 'R."1
86
b. Television ratings
Perhaps less familiar than movie ratings is the fairly new
television rating system. Like the movie rating system, television
181.
The MPAA ratings are enforced by the MPAA-created Classification
and Rating Administration (CARA).... While the rating system is
voluntary, the great majority of producers submit their films to CARA
to be rated.
The movie makers may make cuts based on CARA suggestions, or
they may appeal to the Ratings Appeal Board.... The movie
industry's adoption of CARA immediately led to the decline, and
ultimately the extinction, of all local censorship boards.
Colin Miller, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Wolf v. Ashcroft and the
Constitutionality of Using the MPAA Ratings to Censor Films in Prison, 6
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 265, 273 (2004).
182. See MPAA, Voluntary Movie Rating System, http://www.mpaa.org/
FilmRatings.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (explaining the ratings system).183. Miller, supra note 181, at 273 (quoting MPAA President Jack Valenti,
"the only objective of the ratings is to advise the parent in advance so he or she
may determine the possible suitability or unsuitability of viewing by chil-
dren").
184. Jack Valenti, MPAA, How the Rating System is Used by Theater
Owners and Video Retailers (Dec. 2000), http://www.mpaa.org/Ratings
_Purpose.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
185. Id.
186. Smoke Free Movies, The Solution, http://www.smokefreemovies.ucsf
.edu/solution/index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
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shows contain an age-appropriateness rating.I17 The Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996188 required every television set thirteen inches
or larger sold in the United States to include an electronic chip
allowing parents to block programming based on an encoded
rating. 189 The Act,
gave the industry one year to come up with 'voluntary rules
for rating video programming that contains sexual, violent,
or other indecent materials about which parents should be
informed before it is displayed to children' and to agree
'voluntarily to broadcast signals that contain ratings of such
programming.' If the industry failed to develop rules
acceptable to the FCC, the FCC was required to establish an
advisory committee to recommend a rating system; to
prescribe guidelines and procedures for rating video
programs; and to require stations to include the ratings on
any program that is rated. 190
The Act's "'fail-safe' provision deliberately stops short of
requiring that broadcasters accept the ratings system devised by the
advisory committee,"'191 leaving itself "deliberately toothless to avoid
constitutional problems of prior restraint and compelled speech."'
' 92
As expected, the industry developed an age-based rating system on
its own, which was revised after public disapproval but later
accepted by the FCC as sufficient.1 93
c. Video game ratings
In response to congressional inquiries into violence in video
games, the video! game industry created the Entertainment Software
Rating Board (ESRB) in 1994 as an industry mechanism for self-
187. See CONSUMER & GOV'T AFFAIRS BUREAU, FCC, THE V-CHIP:
PUTTING RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT YOUR CHILDREN WATCH 1-2 (2005),
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/vchip.pdf (explaining the voluntary
ratings system adopted for television programs).
188. 47.U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
189. Id.; CONSUMER & Gov'T AFFAIRS BUREAU, supra note 187.
190. Campbell, supra note 176, at 753 (quoting Telecommunications Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)).
191. 1d. at 754 (quoting J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the
Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1157-58 (1996)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 754-55.
BEYOND ADVERTISING CONTROLS
regulation. 194 Similar to television, the ESRB developed an age-
based ratings system for games. 195 Although video game makers,
unlike their television counterparts, are not required to participate,
the Congressional pressure to do so is so significant that, "WalMart,
Toys R Us, and other retailers ... only stock rated games."' 96 At
least two local governments have attempted to create ordinances that
restrict the selling of video games with certain ratings. 9' At first
glance, such regulation might appear to be simple product regulation
subject to a rational basis review. However, the essence of a video
game is speech, and a game's assigned rating is based on the game's
content. 198 Therefore, a law prohibiting the sale of a video game
based on its rating is regulating speech based on the content of
speech. 199 Such regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, a standard
neither law survived. 200 In the most-watched decision in this area,
Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County, the
Eighth Circuit struck down an attempt by St. Louis County to make
it unlawful for any person to knowingly sell or rent graphically
violent video games to minors. 20 1  The court invalidated the
ordinance because the county failed to prove its first alleged,
compelling interest of "safeguarding the psychological well-being of
minors."20 2  Likewise, in Video Software Dealers Association v.
Maleng, a federal district court applied strict scrutiny to a
194. Entertainment Software Ratings Board, About ESRB, http://www.esrb
.org/about.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
195. Campbell, supra note 176, at 753.
196. Id. at 752.
197. ST. Louis COUNTY, Mo., REV. ORDINANCEs § 602.440 (2005) (making
it unlawful for any person knowingly to sell, rent, or make available
graphically violent video games to minors, or to "permit the free play of'
graphically violent video games by minors, without a parent or guardian's
consent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 9.91.180 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005)
(criminalizing the sale or rental of "violent" video games to minors).
198. Entertainment Software Ratings Board, Game Ratings and Descriptor
Code, http://www.esrb.org/esrbratingsguide.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
199. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954,
957 (8th Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 960; Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d
1180, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
201. Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n, 329 F.3d at 960.
202. Id. at 958 (holding that the County did not establish a compelling
interest for the ordinance, because the County did not provide empirical
evidence that violent video games were psychologically harmful to children).
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Washington law, prohibiting the distribution of violent video or
computer games to minors and found the law unconstitutional. 0 3
The strength of the voluntary agreement strategy, in the context
of the food industry, is the potential ability to limit the industry's
advertising to children, a commitment that could be difficult or
impossible to impose by law. To be most effective, the government,
or private parties, could seek agreements that contain specific criteria
to ensure measurable outcomes. For example, they could ask the
industry to discontinue billboard advertising of unhealthful foods and
beverages rather than requesting broad commitments relating to the
"targeting" of youth, or specific age groups, because nonspecific
commitments are difficult to measure. How does one track all the
ads placed in all the various marketing media to ensure that the
industry is not targeting a specific age group? Billboards are far
easier to see and track. Government or private parties also could
consider prioritizing marketing venues that are difficult for parents to
control, such as event sponsorships (concerts, fairs, theme parks,
etc.) and product placement in movies, television shows, video
204games, and internet sites. These venues can be difficult to track
and measure, but they represent huge marketing venues for the food
industry.
20 5
Unfortunately, like privately negotiated voluntary agreements,
any such agreement negotiated between the food industry group and
the government would be legally unenforceable. 206 It will likely take
media advocacy, threats of legislation, and other pressure tactics, to
compel the industry to abide by its stated promises. Any agreement,
binding or nonbinding, would ultimately be a compromise. Knowing
which principles can be compromised is an essential first step toward
deciding whether an agreement can be a truly effective policy
approach.
203. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
204. See Story & French, supra note 6, at 7-8.
205. Id.
206. Cf Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice
Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1203 (2004) (ad-
dressing New York's inability to compel fast food restaurants to comply with a
1991 voluntary agreement to provide nutritional posters and brochures in
restaurants).
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D. Government Speech: Education & Counter Advertising
Government may have an opinion and may speak out on issues
in which it has a legitimate interest, such as issues involving public
health, safety, and welfare. 20 7 The Supreme Court has explained that
"when the government appropriates public funds to promote a
particular policy of its own[,] it is entitled to say what it wishes."
208
Thus, when the government acts as a speaker, it has wide latitude to
take a substantive position on issues and take steps consistent with
that position. 2 9  Public service messages are familiar forms of
government speech and typically attempt to educate the public about
important issues, such as HIV/AIDS prevention.2 10 In California, the
government produces strong anti-tobacco messages focusing on the
greed and immorality of the tobacco industry.2 11 California buys
radio and television airtime like any other advertiser and spreads its
anti-tobacco message throughout the state.212 California's counter
advertising program has been an important component of a highly
effective, comprehensive tobacco control program. 213  Tobacco
industry challenges to California's hard-hitting ads have lost in
court.
2 14
207. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
208. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995).
209. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (stating that
"viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker"); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 ("A holding
that the [state] University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of
private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's
own speech, which is controlled by different principles"); Rust, 500 U.S. at
192-93.
210. Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 71, 116 (2004).
211. See CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., CALIFORNIA'S TOBACCO EDUCA-
TION MEDIA CAMPAIGN 1 (2004), available at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/tobacco
/documents/pubs/FSMediaCamp.pdf.
212. Id.
213. Press Release, California Department of Health Services, California
Smoking Rates Drop 33 Percent Since State's Anti-Tobacco Program Began I
(May 16, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/tobacco/documents/press
/PressRelease05-22-05.pdf.
214. E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1105-
06 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
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The First Amendment does not protect government speech,
because the government does not need to be protected from itself.
215
As a result, the government cannot invoke the First Amendment in
defense of its own speech. 16 On the other hand, government speech
can be limited by others' First Amendment rights as well as other
basic limits on government power.2 17  However, when the
215. Id. at 1102.
216. Id. at I101.
217. In general, government speech is subject to limitation in six situations.
One such situation is where "[tjhe speech does not have a rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 1108. As with any legislative
action, government speech is invalid if it violates the rational basis test. Id.
Another situation is where the government speech drowns out private speech in
violation of the First Amendment. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1566
(11 th Cir. 1990) (stating that "the government may not monopolize the 'mar-
ketplace of ideas,' thus drowning out private sources of speech"); Warner
Cable Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 (11 th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "the government may not speak so loudly as to make it impossible
for other speakers to be heard by their audience").
Government speech will also be subject to limitation where the speech
interferes with constitutionally protected behavior. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at
1109. However, the Supreme Court's "unconstitutional conditions jurispru-
dence has said that the state may exercise its power to spend in order to
discourage protected activity." Id. At some point that discouragement can
become coercion which is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Bonta,
272 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
A limitation additionally exists where the speech funds politically partisan
activity. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998); Leigh Contreras,
Contemplating the Dilemma of Government as Speaker: Judicially Identified
Limits on Government Speech in the Context of Carter v. Las Cruces, 27 N.M.
L. REv. 517, 519 (1997).
Where government compels private citizens to speak or compels
citizens to subsidize speech they disagree with, the government's speech will
be subject to limitation. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct.
1055 (2005) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge brought by beef
producers against an ad campaign run by the government but paid for by an
assessment on the beef producers). The Court in Johanns held that although
the government cannot compel private citizens to express a certain message,
and the government cannot compel citizens to subsidize private speech that
they disagree with, the government can generally compel citizens to subsidize
government speech. Id.; see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1
(1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
Finally, government speech will be limited where the speech violates
the Establishment Clause. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. The government
violates the Establishment Clause when it uses its own speech to endorse
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government speaks truthfully or offers its own opinion on matters
related to public health, it is unlikely that any of the potential
limitations will be relevant.
Therefore, truthful government speech, based on research or the
government's opinion about nutrition or food products, is likely to be
upheld as a valid exercise of the government's power. For example,
if a state government sponsored public service messages
proclaiming, "Kids and soda make a dangerous mix," a legal
challenge by soda manufacturers would likely fail.
Courts prefer more government speech over more government
regulation of speech. 218 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the best solution to speech that the government does
not like (e.g., ads for nutritionally deficient food) is more speech,
specifically more government speech espousing the counterpoints.
21 9
The reality, however, is that effective counter advertisements are
extremely expensive. 220  California's notable success countering
tobacco advertising relies on a significant and dedicated tobacco
tax.22 1 Unfortunately, even with such resources, government will
always be outspent when confronting the billion-dollar tobacco and
food industries.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has significantly limited the
ability of government to directly regulate the commercial media
environment to promote public health goals, whether related to
tobacco products, unhealthful foods, or other advertising that entices
risky behavior, government agencies and public health advocates can
still take action. Governments can regulate nonexpressive conduct
rather than speech, by prohibiting toy give-aways, except when
religion. Id. The Establishment clause reads, in part, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion... . U.S. CONST. amend. I.
218. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1105-06.
219. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996).
The "remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Id. (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
220. See CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., supra note 211, at 2.
221. Id.
222. GOSTIN, supra note 19, at 148. In 1999, the U.S. food industry spent 7.3
billion dollars advertising their products. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
May 200.6]
644 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:603
accompanied by healthful foods, or prohibiting the sale of complete
"meals" that exceed a maximum level of unhealthful components.
Also, health advocates and governments can use enforceable
contracts and voluntary agreements to achieve public health goals
that may not be achievable through regulation. Following these
guidelines, government agencies and public health advocates can
work to improve health outcomes and hold the food industry
accountable for the impact of its media messages.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
Preemption is an ever-present danger, no matter what policy
approach is taken to combat the prevalence of unhealthful food, and
no matter how constitutionally sound a regulation might be.
Preemption occurs when a law passed at a higher level of
government precludes a law passed at a lower level.223 Preemption
can be either express or implied.224 Federal laws such as the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA") 225 can preempt
state and local laws.226  State regulation can also preempt local
laws.
227
223. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
374 (7th ed. 2004).
224. Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states that it
intends to preclude a certain kind of state regulation. Id. Implied preemption
occurs where Congress, through statutory language or a regulatory structure,
precludes state regulation by implication. Id. A final category of preemption,
conflict preemption, occurs where, by virtue of an inherent conflict between
state and federal law, the state law is invalid. See, e.g., id. at 377. This occurs
when a state regulation contradicts the provisions or purposes of a federal law
or where the court determines that Congress meant to "occupy the field." Id. at
374. These distinctions are the subject of much litigation, as even when some
kind of preemption is clear, it is often unclear as to exactly the scope of what is
preempted. See id. at 374-75.
225. FCLAA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (2005).
226. Id. § 1334(a). The idea of federal preemption is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
227. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, at 374.
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The tobacco industry has traditionally argued that preemption is
necessary in order to level the playing field and avoid confusing or
conflicting rules.22' This argument is often an excuse to limit local
regulation, which the industry is less able to control. 229 As a result,
state and local laws are neutralized, and political debate is limited to
the halls of government where the industry enjoys the most
influence.
230
Preemptive legislation has significantly inhibited tobacco
control advocates' efforts. 23 ' The long-term success of any policy
objective demands that advocates: (i) fully understand the concept of
preemption; (ii) watch for opposition efforts that attempt to enact
228. Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, Preemption: Arguments and
Responses 1 (Aug. 2004), http://www.protectlocalcontrol.org/files/preemption
responses.pdf; Robin Hobart, Tobacco Technical Assistance Consortium,
Preemption: Shifting the Battle to Stronger Ground 7 (Sept. 2002), http://www
.ttac.org/assistance/pdfs/AdvicePreemption.pdf.
229. More than 2300 local jurisdictions now have tobacco control
ordinances. Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, supra note 228, at 4. The
cigarette warning label in the United States has been criticized for its weak
language, especially compared to warning labels in countries like Canada and
Brazil. See Karen L. Schneider, Am. Council on Sci. & Health, Gross Pics
Intended to Help Canadian Smokers (July 22, 2002), http://www.acsh.org/
healthissues/newsID.383/healthissuedetail.asp. There is also precedent, at
least in California, for imposing individual state warning regulations because
of an important public health goal. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13
(West 2005). For instance, California's Proposition 65 requires businesses
to warn of potential exposure to carcinogens or reproductive toxins. Id.
§ 25249.6.
230. Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, Preemption: Tobacco Control's #1
Enemy 1 (Aug. 2004), http://www.no-smoke.org/document.php?id=397.
231. See, e.g., ADVOCACY INST., PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL
TOBACCO CONTROL POLICIES (1998), available at http://www.advocacy.org
/publications/mtc/preemption.htm; ROBIN HOBART, AM. MED. ASS'N,
PREEMPTION: TAKING THE LOCAL OUT OF TOBACCO CONTROL 6 (2003),
available at http://www.smokelessstates.org/downloads/2003_Preemption.pdf;
Michael Siegel et al., supra note 7, at 858-63. In certain circumstances,
legislation adopted at higher levels of government can have significant positive
public health effects. For example, a law passed at the state level can extend
public health protections to local communities that might not pass their own
ordinance on the topic. However, this strategy runs the risk of preempting
more stringent local public health efforts unless the state or federal law
explicitly allows for stricter local ordinances through the inclusion of anti-
preemptive language. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, at 374.
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preemptive law; and (iii) make the inclusion of anti-preemptive
language a key objective for any law passed.
232
232. A number of California tobacco control laws contain language
explicitly allowing local governments to adopt stricter ordinances. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 6404.5 (West 2005) (prohibiting smoking in enclosed places of
employment); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22971.3, 22970.2 (West 2005)
(requiring tobacco retailers, distributors, and wholesalers to obtain a license);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22962, 22960 (West 2005) (prohibiting most
forms of self-service displays of tobacco).
